Volljährigkeit und Schulabschluß -Ein Vergleich zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundes republik Deutschland* Inhalt: Die Studie untersucht das Verhalten der westdeutschen und amerikanischen Jugend der frühen 60er Jah re und stellt es dem derselben Alterskohorte zu Ende des Jahrzehnts gegenüber. Hinsichtlich der Berufs-und Be schäftigungsmuster, die jeweils zur Ausprägung kamen, konnten für die entsprechenden Länder erstaunliche Gleich förmigkeiten aufgezeigt werden; die Prozesse hingegen, die dieses Ergebnis bewirkten, erwiesen sich als von auffäl liger Unterschiedlichkeit. Es werden Überlegungen angestellt, die diesen Befund erklären sollen.
Most social research, understandably perhaps, is focused on adult populations. Another significant focus involves young people, those who have not yet achieved adult status. With relatively rare ex ceptions, the transition period between these two conditions has been overlooked. Among 1965 . The pre sent article provides a basic descriptive account of that transition for young people ages 16 to 24 in two highly industrialized societies, the Unit ed States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Our aim is to show the major full-time commit ments of these persons in the two societies, and in so doing, to indicate important differences between them in the ways in which young per sons "come of age" .
Many studies of "total societies" and their intern al processes begin with what might be called a "generalizing bias" , that is, they impose a com mon analytic framework on a range of discrete cases. Usually, this choice reflects some attempt * This work is a by-product from a larger project which is being supported by the Canada Council. My appreciation (RH) for this support is most gratefully acknowledged.
to reach highly generalized conclusions about "universal invariants" , about fundamental social processes which characterize all societies. While perfectly acceptable from one standpoint, this strategy leads to a corresponding difficulty, namely, a tendency to overlook unique or particu lar developments within the societies being com pared. This, in turn, leads to highly determin istic theories of society and of history; it facilita tes the assumption that particular social forms arise in response to ineluctable needs inherent in the processes of modernization and industrializa tion. An alternative possibility, that societies have a range of choices open to them or that particu lar social structures may only reflect special po litical desisions, is therefore seldom seriously entertained.
Many such accounts show what might be refer red to as the "equivalency" thesis, one which assumes that all societies at the same stage of development will have roughly similar social processes. Thus, all "advanced industrial socie ties" have approximately equal rates of social mobility, are required to select talent for the higher strata on non-particularistic bases, or must provide high levels of educational opportunity in order to fulfill the escalating labor force "require ments" of the advanced industrial system (LIPSET and BENDIX 1959). A major variation on the equivalency theme recognizes differences within any given sample of nations but argues that ba sic "evolutionary" or "developmental" processes will ultimately lead to equivalent outcomes (HARBISON and MYERS 1959; KERR et al. 1960; TREIMAN 1970) . Typically, the United States is taken as the point of comparison, as the "most advanced" case; thus, the U.S. experience pro vides the guideline as to what is "necessary" and "inevitable" for advanced industrialization. The progress of the other countries is measured in terms of how closely they approximate the American standard (DAHRENDORF 1965). TAL-COT PARSONS states that the United States has taken "the lead in the latest phase of moderniza tion" . (PARSONS 1971: 114) The basic causal mechanism of most such theo ries is presumed changes in the labor force re quirements which come with advanced industrial ization. A common theme is that as the pro ductive task becomes more "rationalized" , so too must its supervision and control. Thus, the division of industrial labor is accompanied by a proliferation of the bureaucratic form. This, in combination with use of advanced technology creates the demand for proportionately more highly trained and technically proficient white collar workers who can manage the complex needs of the industrial system. A corollary development, of course, is a relative decline in the demand for traditional blue collar labor. Given this shift in the kind of work done, the society must provide mechanisms to feed the changing labor demands; it must both "democratize" and expand access to educational training. Thus, advanced industri al societies witness an expansion of the middle class and a relative decline of the working class, with the educational system providing the neces sary means for movement between those classes.
Until recently, it was rather uncritically assumed that the United States was at or near the final flowering of this process, and that all other ad vanced industrial nations would soon follow the U.S. lead. In the late 1950's and early 1960's, the depiction of the U.S. as a "middle class so ciety" was common. Such claims, typically, would be accompanied by a projection of future trends to show the "middle class" dominance becoming ever greater. This paper compares the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in light of the several considerations just raised. First, we make a simple structural comparison between the cur rent labor forces of the two societies. Then we turn to a comparison of the respective social pro cesses through which these structures are staffed. Although the occupational structures in both societies are virtually indistinguishable, the me chanisms by which new generations are "track ed" into those occupations differ substantially. The "fit" between process and structure is closer in Germany than in the United States; this in turn may account for other differences between the two nations.
Preliminary occupational evidence for the Unit ed States and West Germany is shown in Table  One . The U.S. data come from the Survey Re search Center's (University of Michigan) 1968 election study; the German data come from a 1969 survey of the West German population1.
Shown (in Part A) are the occupational distribu tions for males and females in the two countries.
One is struck, first of all, by the close similarity between the two nations in their basic occupa tional structures. There are no statistically signi- It will be noted in Table 1 that in the non-farm population the proportion of blue-collar workers among the young is considerably greater than within the entire employed populations. This points to some upward mobility occuring later on as blue collar workers become independent businessmen. In part also the result stems form differences in retirement practices. In the 65 and over age category, a clear majority of those still gainfully employed were independent busi nessmen. In terms of the present categories, they are white collar.
Sizable majorities of employed women in both countries, by comparison, are engaged in white collar occupations. The widely-disseminated claim about the new "middle class majority" in short is based on labor force figures that are not differentiated by sex. Historically one has seen two tendencies: first, a rising proportion of women in the labor force in both nations; and second, a tendency for women to enter the labor force at the lower white collar "clerical and sales" ranks. Much of the speculation about "class transformations" in fact refers mainly to these points, not to some fundamental realign ment of social classes. Taking the social science convention that occupations of heads of house holds determine family class position, we con clude that the middle-class majority has not yet arrived in these nations. One must remember too that many of the women in white collar jobs are the wives or daughters of men engaged in blue collar occupations (MILLER 1964, Chapter 10; SWEET 1973).
The similarity of occupational stmctures, it will be noted, also appears for the youthful segments of these populations (Part B of Table 1 ). These figures will be discussed later in the article.
Given the very similar "outcomes" in West Ger many and the United States, the related ques tion may be asked about the processes by which these outcomes are attained. For this purpose, it has proven useful to compare the activities of young people, ages 16-24, seven and eight years prior to these "outcomes" . This in turn allows some determination, albeit a crude one, of the relative "goodness of fit" between occupational structure and early training in the two societies.
The West German data come from a relatively large survey of German youth done in Septem ber 19622. The U.S. data are taken from publish ed reports of the 1960 census (U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 1964). For convenience, we discuss the U.S. data first. Because the "careers" of males and females differ so sharply, they are considered separately. 1960 Census data on U.S. males aged 16-24, then, are shown in Table 2 .
Unsurprisingly, the large majority of 16-19 year old males are still in school, most of them finish ing up their high school education. Even at this early age, however, approximately a third had left school for other pursuits. Some, approxima tely one in twenty, were in the armed forces. One in ten were either unemployed or simply "not in the civilian labor force" . Of those employed in the civilian labor force, a sizable majority were in blue collar occupations.
Possibly the most insistent claim about advanced industrial societies, at least until very recently, has been the assumption of pressing and escala ting educational needs. As mentioned above, it was rather common, already in the early 60's, to hear that a majority or near-majority of young people were attending college (TROW 1962; LIP-SET 1963: 260; PARSONS 1971: 95)3 * . Given these conclusions, the U.S. data must come as something of a surprise: Even in the peak attendence years of ages 20 and 21, only 20.8% of the male popu lation was enrolled in an institution of higher learning. (This figure, for reasons to be discussed later in the article, does involve some underesti mation.) At this juncture, an additional 5% were in school at lower levels, and the remaining threequarters -the large majority -were out of school and committed elsewhere. Slightly more than 10% were in the armed forces, about 12% were either unemployed or not in the labor for ce. The remainder were already established in the early phase of their adult careers. As of ages 20 and 21, blue collar employment still exceeds white collar employment, the ratio being approx imately 3 to 1.
By the ages 22-24, approximately 15% of the males were still in school. Even at this relatively late date, about a tenth were with the armed forces and another tenth were unemployed or not actively seeking employment. Of those em ployed in civilian occupations, blue collar workers still outnumber white collar workers by a large margin.
Lacking longitudinal data, the "links" between the evidence just considered and the subsequent labor force picture shown in Table 1 can only be inferred. One may assume that most of those still in college at ages 22-24 would enter the labor force at the white collar level. Some of those in the armed forces at this point would have been planning to continue military careers; the remainder, we expect, would have entered the civilian labor force mostly at the blue collar level. Most of the then unemployed, likewise, would probably find employment in the manual ranks.
The experience of American males in 1960, then, may be summarized as follows: In the youngest age groups, the majority were in schools, most of them still in high school. By age 20, however, the largest portion had already left school and moved off into civilian jobs, the sizable majori ty going directly into blue collar work. For the typical American male,'"Coming of Age in America" did not mean going to college; rather, at that time the "university" career line was fol lowed by only a minority. For most, " coming of age" meant going to the factories, the shops, and the construction projects. Some other "ca reers" -essentially postponements of careerswere also available. About a tenth were in mili tary occupations. Another tenth were unemploy ed or out of the labor force altogether. There was, in short, a range of "opportunity" open to American males. The most attractive of these, has received exaggerated attention, far out of line with its actual numerical importance. Most males followed other opportunities and other career lines, ones which offered much less pro mise for the future.
Although not shown in our presentation, it need scarcely be mentioned that these various "oppor tunity" lines are themselves linked to social class backgrounds (BLAU and DUNCAN 1967: Chapters 5 and 6; SEWELL 1971)4. Most of the university students are supplied by middle and upper mid dle class families; those who "leave" the schools for immediate employment come disproportiona tely from the working and lower middle classes. . These trends seem to reflect evasion of military service more than the "pressing" educational needs of the ad vanced industrial society. Another spin-off of the war could be some increase in the proportions in the armed forces. There would, accordingly, be some declines in the other categories. For these reasons, it would be a mistake to "freeze" the results and suggest that they represent " the" pattern for the United States5 * .
A comparison of the figures in the preceeding paragraph with those given earlier would suggest that a sizable increase in attendance occured be tween 1960 and 1962. That conclusion, however, is not warranted since the results are not com parable. The 1960 figure is taken from census results and the percentage is based on the entire cohort. The figures for 1962 to 1972 given here are based on the Current Population Surveys, that is, on samples of the U.S. population. The key consideration in this connection is that the sur veys sample only the non-institutional civilian population. The 1970 census found 14.3% of the 20-21 year old cohort in the armed forces. The C.P.S. figures then overestimate attendance be cause of the reduced "denominator" used in these calculations. As against the 1970 figure of 40.9% given by the C.P.S., the census found 33.9% of the males in that cohort attending col lege.
The initial patterns for young females are simi lar to those of the males (Table 3 ). The majori ty of the youngest cohort was still in school, for the most part in the high schools. Among those 5 A corollary point to emphasize here is that " social structures" change -sometimes rather dramarically -in response to short-term political forces. Some one "tapping into" the American system in the midto late-60's would get a very distorted view o f the character o f the American educational arrangement. Some serious analytic problems would then be posed if that "picture" were taken as a necessary fea ture o f contemporary American society. As an ex ample, see PARSONS and PLATT (1973).
already employed, the majority was in white col lar positions, as discussed earlier. For the most part, "white collar employment" in this instance means secretarial, clerical, sales and other "lower" white collar activities. Relative to males of the same age, there was less unemployment but a considerably larger segment was not in the labor force. Of those, many were housewives who, in all probability, would never enter the labor force; their non-labor force status, in short, would be permanent, not a transitional period interven ing between other activities.
In subsequent cohorts, the proportion in school predictably declines; correlatively, there are in creases in both the employed and "not in the labor force" categories. Among females in the high attendance years, the proportion enrolled in college was less than that for males, about 13%. The predominance of white collar work among employed females was evident in all cohorts, a finding consistent with labor force data for all females in the ensuing decade6.
It proves useful to postpone further discussion of the U.S. data until the comparative evidence for the Federal Republic of Germany is present ed. Although the categories of analysis afforded by the German survey are not exact equivalents of the U.S. data, they are close enough to indi cate some sizable differences in the "process of status attainment" between the two societies. As before, males and females are treated sepa rately.
The first striking difference one observes in the data for West German males is the much smaller proportion of youths in school, even within the youngest cohort (Table 4) . Whereas the majori ty of U.S. males aged 16-19 were still in school, the majority of equivalent West German youth had already left schools for civilian employment. In contrast to the U.S. figure of 66% in school during those years, only 17% of the German youth were engaged in fulltime school activities.
A second striking feature of the West German arrangement is the large percentage involved in some kind of apprenticeship or on-the-job train ing7. About two-fifths of the younger cohort (a majority of those 16 and 17, and about a quar ter of the remainder) reported receiving some training of this sort. Such training, for all prac tical purposes, is unheard of in the United Sta tes8 9 .
In comparison with the United States, a higher proportion of 16-19 year old West German males were already employed in civilian occupations.
The figures are about 15% and 40% respectively. Of those already employed at age 16 to 19, the overwhelming majority were in blue collar work.
Only a few persons in the sample were occupied in military endeavors. This "result" does involve a distortion of the reality since West German re armament had already achieved a significant post war "takeoff49. Unemployment was very low in comparison to the United States; none of the 16-19 year olds reported that they were out of work10. Finally, the sizable U.S. proportion "not in the labor force" is missing from the German data. The German survey contained a category "Other" which is about as close to "Not in the Labor Force" as this study provides. There were, however, no respondents in that category. The extended period of unemployment which touches a significant minority of American youth was, effectively, non-existent in the West German case.
Turning to the next oldest age group, one finds 14% still in school, most of them in the univer sities. A German university begins with the equiv alent of the American sophomore year, hence a simple U.S.-German comparison is not possible (LINDEGREN 1957: 5)11. A rule-of-thumb, esti mate, omitting U.S. freshman, would show an Ameri can figure of 15 or 16 per cent, as compared to the West German nine per cent. Other adjustments to reflect further differences between the two systems would narrow this difference even more1 1 12.
In sum, claims about dramatic differences between the societies, at least on this score, appear to be unfounded. The belief held by some West German intellectuals that the U.S. is distinctively "ad vanced" and West Germany perculiarly "backward" is largely without foundation. As of about 1960, the real difference between the two countries in respect to university education must have been rather small, a matter of a few percentage points13.
11 In the normal course o f events, a West German stu dent is in school for thirteen years before going on to university. He or she would normally be 18 years o f age in that thirteenth year.
12 The U.S. figure, for example, includes part-time stu dents. It appears too that the rate of dropping-out is higher in the U.S. than in Germany; thus, the U.S. figures include a higher proportion who are "in" school but not likely to successfully complete the year. Both these points are discussed later in the text. There are some additional qualifications one must add to this summary judgment; these will be dis cussed below.
On-the-job training is relatively rare among the 20-21 year olds, the vast majority of them being already in full-time employment. One per son out of 356 reported that he was unemployed and four said they were with the armed forces. Although a larger proportion of German than U.S. youth are employed at this stage of their lives, the proportion in blue collar vs. white col lar work were roughly the same in the two coun tries.
In the oldest age category, one finds eight per cent of West German males still in the universi ties, as compared with the equivalent U.S. figure of 11.8%. The narrowing of the U.S.-German gap among the 22-24 year olds might reflect the low er drop-out rates in the German universities or perhaps a slightly greater proportion staying on for graduate training. About 8% were either in technical schools {Fachschulen) or else receiving on-job training. The remaining 85% were employ ed in full-time occupations (with the exception of one respondent who said he was unemployed). The overwhelming majority of those employed were in manual occupations.
Comparable data for West German females are shown in Table 5 . Relative to the U.S., few fe males continued their schooling to ages 16-19, only about 20% being enrolled. An additional fifth were involved in on-the-job training. The majority of West German women ages 16-19 were already employed in full-time civilian occu pations, and of these the majority -showing the same labor force pattern as American females -were employed in non-manual work. At this age level, very few women were housewives (about 2%), reflecting a later normal age of mar riage in Germany than in the United States. None of the women in this age category reported that they were unemployed.
In the 20-21 age category, four per cent of the females were in the universities, a figure well below the equivalent for the United States. About three-quarters of this group were employed, most of them in white collar occupations. Also at this point, the percentage who were housewives showed an increase. No respondent in this ca tegory reported being unemployed. A very small percentage were classified as "other" .
Among the West German females ages 22-24, about 3% were still in the universities, about the same as the comparable U.S. figure. This sug gests that while proportionately more American than West German women enroll in college, a larger proportion of the latter stay on through the completion of their degree. Also in this age category, there is a clear drop-off in labor force participation and a correlative rise in the proporWhat lessons can be learned from these com parisons? As we noted earlier, the final "out comes" in both nations are approximately the same. There are substantial differences between the two countries, however, in the processes through which these outcomes are achieved. Fo cusing for the moment on males, consider the following: About half the males in both nations eventually come into blue collar labor (Table 1 , Part B). Among West German youth, nearly three-quarters of this blue collar group was "in place" by age 19 and essentially all of it was "in place" by age 21 (Table 4 ). In the United States, on the other hand, only about one-fifth of the eventual blue collar workers were employ ed by the age of 19, about three-fifths were "in place" at age 21, and at age 24, about a quarter of the eventual blue collar workers were still engaged in other activities. The United States' pattern, in short, is characterized by what might be called "digressionary" tracks. In this way "coming of age" in America involves a set of Perhaps the most important "digression" in volves the tendency of American youth to remain in school longer, at least until the end of high school, or about twelve years. This extensive "education" , it is said, is "necessary" in order to compete in the labor market of the advanced industrial society, yet little is imparted in the high schools in the U.S. which in any sense pre pares one for eventual blue colllar labor -the fate, let us emphasize, to which more than half are eventually "assigned" (LUCAS 1 9 7 1 )15. The alternative West German arrangement has large numbers in on-the-job apprenticeship training at this age. Thus, while American males in the 16-19 year old bracket are occupied in high school classrooms, learning high schools civics or English literature, a large proportion of their West Ger man counterparts are receiving on-job trainingthat is, being taught the skills necessary to se cure steady employment, guarantee a reasonable income, in short, to begin one's adult life16.
failures) however should not blind one to the ma jor "flows" within the population. The processes being discussed here could be better charted, to be sure, through the use o f a long-term panel study. The different careers (e.g. upwardly mobile, nonmobile, digressionary) could then be followed, the quantities established, the satisfactions or resent ments, assessed, etc. A part o f the "anomie" in the life of American males o f the 50's and 6 0 's was stimulated by the pe culiarities o f the draft law which allowed persons to be taken between the 18th and the 26th year thus making career planning and employment rather difficult. Employers in many cases did not wish to hire persons who could have been drafted at any time. This feature o f the institutional arrangements would have enlarged the unemployed and the "not in labor force" percentages in the younger age cate gories. In 1970, the arrangement was changed to a one-year liability and still later the all-volunteer army was adopted.
15 LUCAS reports that many firms use "education" as a screening device; it allows them to reduce the number o f applicants. In many instances the educational "demand" makes no technical sense. Sons with more education than their fathers are denied jobs similar to those of their fathers because, it is said, they lack the "requirements". See pp. 1 1 6 -1 1 7 and 366.
16 The young worker associates with older workers and also undergoes an informal and appropriate "politi cal socialization" process. Those who engage in di gressionary careers postpone this education. For an interesting study o f this process see LAUPEOU-LEPLATRE (1960). We do not wish to suggest that the German arrangement in its entirety represents
The lack of marketable skills makes a second "digressionary" career line, military service, some what attractive. For same at least, military ser vice "replaces" the on-job training which young American males are otherwise denied, a point frequentely emphasized in armed forces' recruit ing efforts. Many of the "careers" for which one may prepare in the armed forces unfortunately have little merket value in civilian life.
A final diversion, for at least a tenth of U.S. males between 16-24, is unemployment or the limbo status, "not in the civilian labor force" . This tenth, for all practical purpose, is put "on the streets" , the arrangement of the economy effectively deny ing them gainful employment (U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 1974: 17-25). Aside from the obvious direct cost in lost productivity, this arrangement entails other social costs. It adds to the costs of welfare and unemployment compensation pro grams. And in a setting where the ability to spend is important to one's "life chances" , there will be considerable incentive to acquire income through illegal means; this arrangement, in short, probably contributes to the generally high rate of crime in the United States. And where one is apprehended and sent through "correctional" institutions, the chances for a relatively permanent criminal "ca reer" , according to most accounts, are increased. This too would add to the overall social cost and, for those involved, would further postpone nor mal adult careers17 * .
As was previously noted, in 1960 only about a fifth of American males and perhaps 13 or 14 per cent of American females were actually enroll ed in colleges and universities in the prime atten- dance years. In many cases, perhaps in most ca ses, even this experience may be seen as a "digres sion" from normal adult life. Nation-wide, taking all colleges and universities, only about half of those who enter actually remain through to the completion of their degree. Those years of "in complete college" have very little discernible ef fects on careers; for all practical purposes they are just another postponement. And here again, one has direct social costs, both to the families who must pay for those years and to the public whose tax dollars underwrite the effort18.
A sizable proportion of those "going to college" , especially those from the working classes, in fact enroll in junior or community colleges ra ther than in the state colleges and universities. According to the leading account, the junior col lege experience is basically diversionary. BURTON CLARK'S study (1960) of one such institution show ed that many of the students "in" the college were actually in the process of dropping out. There was an extensive "counselling" effort in this par ticular junior college, the thrust of the effort being to "cool out" what were termed the "latent ter minal" students and direct them elsewhere, most ly into full-time employment.
Such experience points to another serious problem with the statistics on educational accomplishment. The official statistics on the numbers " in college" count all "years" of college as equal. The fresh man year in the high quality university is counted as the equal of the first year in the junior col- lege. The year successfully completed is counted as the equal of the year in which another student "dropped out" or was "counselled out" . The assumption that "one equals one" is clearly not justified. Much of the expansion of educational opportunity in the fifties and sixties must have involved what could be called "debased units" . It is unlikely that West German education of this period involved a comparable quantity of such "doubtful years" .
The large discrepancy between our one-fifth col lege attendance figure and the more optimistic figures of 40% or even half that were common fare in academic commentaries of the last decade deserves some attention. Perhaps the best known of these commentaries is the TROW article (1962).
On the basis of 1960 data, TROW states that about 38% of the 18 to 21 year old population was enrolled in institutions of higher learning.
The difference between our figure and TROW's is that ours is a tme proportion, whereas TROW supplies a ratio -in this case, a very misleading one. The denominator of that ratio is the total population aged 18 to 21. The numerator, on the other hand, is the total number of persons en rolled in colleges, at all levels and all ages. Thus, any college student aged 17 or less and any aged 22 or more is included in the numerator, but not in the denominator. In a period where people were going to college at a younger age and stay ing in college and graduate schools for longer periods, this ratio thus involves considerable dis tortion -in this case, over-estimation by an approximate factor of two19 * . Another cautionary statement with respect to these figures is needed. Our Tables 2 and 3 show the actual percentages in given age groups who were enrolled as of 1960. One should note, however, that some of the persons in the 20-21 category who were in the labor force at that point might have achieved some college educa tion when they were 18 or 19 or even when 16 or 17. The figures in those tables in short show their activity at a given time and neglect their educational achievements either before or after that point. That one-fifth attendance figure, the highest indicated for 1960, understates the real accomplishment.
One way of getting at the real accomplishment is to pick this group up again in the 1970 Cen sus and examine the reported levels then, at which point one could assume almost all formal educa tion would be completed. The best data we could find have results for the age category 30-34, that is, the middle and older age groups of In West Germany there is a markedly different lead-in to the normal or conventional male ca reer. There is, first of all, an earlier exit from for mal schooling. To the extent that any education follows, it consists of on-the-job training which is likely to have a close and integral link to the later normal career, This education obviously "fits" much better with (or has more "relevance" for) what one will be doing for the rest of one's life than most of what goes on in an American high school or junior college. It is at least an open question as to whether German youth suf fers by being deprived of the longer years of for mal schooling "enjoyed" by their U.S. counter parts. Two of the digressionary tracks so apparent in the U.S., unemployment and the "not in the labor force" status, were absent from the West German scene. A corollary lesson here is that an advanced industrial society can obviously do quite well with many fewer formally educated persons than exist in the United States.
One up-shot of the American arrangement, a rather bizarre one, is that the United States is perhaps the only society in history with signifi cant numbers of college-educated manual workers. The percentage of economically active blue collar males reporting at least some college education has risen from 4% in 1952 to about 11% in 1964. A National Opinion Research Center sur vey from 1974 puts the current proportion at 17%. In this respect, PARSONS might well be right: The United States almost certainly has taken "the lead in the latest phase of moderni zation"21 * . Touching on a related theme, it might be suggested that the presence of college-educated blue collar workers points to some "proletariani zation" of the middle class. Given the workingclass origins on many of these persons, however, it appears rather to be a case of the "non-bourgeoisification" of a segment of the working class.
There are some marked differences between the two nations as well in terms of the early "train ing" of females. As with males, German women leave formal schooling earlier than American wo men. For most, school is followed by on-the-job training or direct movement into full-time employ ment, either of these apparently preceeding mar riage. Although the Census categories for the U.S.
do not provide all the desirable detail, the ten dency for most American women seems more likely to involve a direct move from high school to marriage. At no point do we find a majority of young U.S. women in the labor force, in sharp contrast to the patterns observed for West Germany.
Concerning "training" for marriage, the best that can be said in this connection is that the rela tive delay in marriage in West Germany provides some additional years of maturation and wisdom for both sexes which would eventually be brought to the task. Labor force participation of women prior to marriage might be expected to have si milar effects. Certainly, much of the "education" acquired in the later years of American high schools or, for a small minority of women, in col lege, would have only the most tenuous relation ship to any adult role, marital or occupational.
This adds up to the suggestion that the West Ger man arrangement, to use KARL MANNHEIM'S phrase, has more " functional rationality" than the American one. The early training and experience provide a better "fit" for adult life than is the case in the United States. This is not meant to pre-judge the "substantive rationality" of either arrangement. The end product in both cases, the entire system, might well be deficient in whole or in part. But seen simply in terms of providing a clear linkage between growing up and what one is going to do when grown up, the West German arrangement appears to be the more adequate.
The differences between the United States and West Germany in the transition between youth and adulthood provide strong evidence against the unilinear evolutionary theory discussed earlier.
As we have already mentioned, the net result of these various processes, the ultimate shape of the adult labor force, is approximately the same in both nations. Although the " structural de mands" might be equivalent, the " responses" of two societies to these demands are not22. In the one case, the "demand" is met by extended formal education and other diversionary career paths, in the other, by early training and exper-22 The "structural demands" might be equivalent, but then again, they might not. The similarities might mask important differences, some o f which may stem from differences in the process (see, for example, the discussion in note 17).
iences with direct linkages to later adult careers. The West German case thus provides some evi dence that the "anomic" features of contempo rary American society are not inherent in the advanced industrial system. Long years of formal schooling are clearly not necessary to satisfy the labor force requirements of advanced industrial societies; and extensive unemployment is not required for economic stabilization.
The present discussion of the West German de velopment has been focused on the experience of persons coming of age in the early 1960's. At that time there was a single "digression" built into the career lines of the West German males, that being the military service obligation. In the last few years, a second "digression" has made its appearance on the scene, substantial enemployment. If unemployment were to become a permanent feature in the Federal Republic, one might then see the development of the related features of digressionary careers observed on the American scene. On the other hand, if it is a short term, a transitional phenomenon, one might then see a continuation of the process observed in the 1960's.
The "solutions" available to a society, in short, are not wholly determined by ineluctable features of the complex industrial system. Rather, a range of options is open to them, and the choice among those options is not "mandated" by system "pre requisites"23. The focus on equivalency theory and its evolutionary variant has led observers to overlook key differences in the political econo mies of modern industrial nations and in their so cialization processes, and thus to minimize the potential impact of political decisions or conscious design. In short, there is some element of choice available in the construction of institutional pat terns; to overlook this is to mn the risk of mistaking contingent for necessary truths.
23 Intellectuals may themselves play some role in creat ing parallel results. If they assume a single pattern of development and take the most advanced country as a model, activist intellectuals may induce legisla tors to respond accordingly, through their arguments o f "necessity". Some such change may be "necessary". On the other hand, they may have simply played a role in fulfilling their own prophecies.
